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The Long-term Economic Implications of Brexit for Scotland:  
An Interregional Analysis1 
 
Abstract 
The analysis of this paper offers a cautionary tale about the economic cost of European 
disintegration. Scotland offers an interesting twist on that story as somewhere that voted to 
remain part of the EU but is now negatively affected, even though it is less directly exposed to EU 
trade than the UK, and even if it were to achieve a softer Brexit such as EEA or even full EU 
membership (as it has aspirations to do). The analysis includes potentially important lessons for 
the many nations and regions in which there exists pressures to move away from trade 
liberalisation and towards protectionism. 
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1. Introduction  
While the likely impact of Brexit on the economy currently dominates policy debate in the UK there 
is also considerable international interest. This applies even beyond the immediate speculation 
concerning the impact on the UK’s EU trading partners. There has been growing discontent with 
globalisation across many countries and there is a concern that other countries might leave the EU 
– particularly and indeed the initial focus was on the possibility of a Greek exit. Furthermore, there 
are strong nationalist/ populist movements pressing for increased protectionism within the EU and 
beyond.2  
Most economists predict that leaving the EU will deliver a direct negative shock to trade, labour 
mobility and investment in the UK. There remains debate, however, over the scale of these effects 
and their subsequent impacts on economic activity. There is also a potentially offsetting benefit to 
the public finances through avoiding the net positive contribution that the UK presently makes to 
the EU budget. Dhingra et al. (2016a, 2016b, 2017a), Ebell and Warren (2016), HM Treasury 
(2016a, b), OECD (2016), Oxford Economics (2016) and PWC (2016) predict strongly negative 
economic effects from leaving the EU, whilst Capital Economics (2016) and Economists for Brexit 
(2016) give a more positive account.  
But any impacts of Brexit are accompanied by substantial uncertainty. Given that this is the first 
time a major economy has withdrawn from the EU, there is no direct prior information which can 
be used to measure impacts or guide attempts to mitigate any negative effects. Therefore, in order 
to aid our understanding of the nature and likely size of different impacts, an ex ante simulation 
                                                          
2 In the US the Trump administration decided not to join the Trans Pacific Partnership and wishes to renegotiate 
NAFTA. 
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model provides a valuable aid. However, such a model must be based on rigorous theoretical 
principles and, in this case, must be multi-sectoral, given that leaving the EU will impact 
differentially on UK industries, partly, but not wholly, reflecting their EU export and import 
dependency. 
Given the heterogeneity of UK, and indeed EU, regions,  there is naturally considerable policy 
interest in the regional impacts of Brexit. While there has been some discussion of the likelihood 
of effects varying across UK regions, based essentially on spatial differences in EU trade patterns, 
this is, as yet, under-researched (Cicerone et al, 2017; Dhingra et al. 2017b; Los et al. 2017; 
Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute, 2016; Springford et al. 2016). In this paper we 
analyse the likely impact of leaving the EU on Scotland, a NUTS 1 region of the UK.3 The Scottish 
case is of particular interest for a number of reasons. First, as part of the UK, Scotland suffers, 
direct, indirect and induced impacts from leaving. Scotland is actually less directly exposed to EU 
trade than the rest-of-the UK (RUK), but since it is highly integrated with the RUK economy we 
expect strong indirect and induced geographic spillover effects. This implies that that the impacts 
on both Scotland and RUK should be modelled simultaneously. Scotland is therefore illustrative of 
many EU regions in that the impact of a national shock from leaving will be transmitted partly 
through spillover effects from the other regions of the host nation. However, this is an aspect of 
Brexit that has yet to be explored. 
Second, Scotland is the region of the UK with the most extensive devolved fiscal, expenditure and 
legislative powers. In Scotland, many of the adaptive and mitigating policies that may be needed 
                                                          
3 Scotland makes up less than 10% of the UK economy on all conventional measures (except land area). 
4 
 
to accompany leaving the EU will have to be taken by the Scottish Parliament. The impact on the 
Scottish economy therefore needs to be separately modelled. 
Third, there is also a related political issue. Scotland voted solidly (62%), for the UK to stay within 
the EU.4 The Scottish First Minister initially reacted to this with a call for a second independence 
referendum for Scotland, a request that was denied by the UK Prime Minister. While the pressure 
for a further referendum is currently in abeyance, if leaving the EU imposes a continuing economic 
burden on the Scottish economy this could be the trigger for future political disruption. However, 
given the degree of economic interdependence with RUK, independence from the UK (but within 
the EU) would fail to insulate the Scottish economy from the RUK’s leave decision.  A final, 
pragmatic, reason for our focus on Scotland is the regional data quality and availability; in 
particular, the existence of official input-output tables. Together with the UK data, they permit the 
development of an interregional social accounting matrix, which is used in the calibration of an 
interregional CGE for Scotland and RUK. This allows us to conduct what is the first, as far as we are 
aware, full interregional CGE analysis of Brexit, albeit only for two regions, Scotland and RUK.5 
We obtain a number of interesting results. These include substantial negative effects on both 
Scotland and RUK, with the impact on the latter region being greater, reflecting Scotland’s lower 
exposure to EU trade. Of course, the scale of the effects varies with the precise nature of the post 
leave situation, with the WTO default – “no deal” or “hard Brexit” - position creating the greatest 
negative effects. We also confirm that there are strong spillovers to Scotland from the RUK: an 
                                                          
4 This reflects a distinct Scottish effect, not the result of Scotland’s age, educational or social make up. No areas of 
Scotland voted to leave the EU. 
5 Dhingra et al. (2017b) derive results for all NUTS2 regions of the UK, but they do so by distributing national industry 
results to regions in accordance with those regions’ sectoral employment shares. 
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explicitly interregional analysis proves essential if the significant biases that would result from a 
“standalone” assessment of the impact of Brexit on the Scottish economy are to be avoided. 
Furthermore, while these adverse impacts are mitigated by the reduction in the net fiscal 
contribution to the EU, they are not, even on the most optimistic estimates, nearly sufficient to 
offset them. In fact, the fiscal position after leaving the EU is always worse than before because of 
the lost taxing revenue flowing from reduced economic activity. Nor do our results represent a 
worst case scenario: if dynamic effects link productivity to the degree of openness or inward 
investment the scale of the contraction would be exacerbated, as it would be if the pressures for 
international migration created by Brexit are reflected in actual population movements. Our 
results also shed doubt on the populist notion that it would be in our interest to erect import 
barriers in retaliation for any EU-imposed barriers to our exports: this would actually add to the 
economic bad news. 
Overall, we believe that our analysis offers a cautionary tale about the economic cost of European 
disintegration. Scotland offers an interesting twist on that story as it is negatively affected, even 
though it is less directly exposed to EU trade than the UK, and even if it were to achieve a softer 
Brexit such as EEA or even full EU membership (as it has aspirations to do). However, as we 
emphasise above there are potentially important lessons for any of the nations and regions in 
which there exists pressures to move away from trade liberalisation and towards protectionism. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises the key channels through 
which leaving the EU may have an impact on the Scottish economy. Section 3 provides a short 
outline of the modelling framework. Section 4 sets out a range of scenarios that could hold in a 
post-Brexit world, whilst Section 5 presents the key results. Section 6 concludes.  
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2. Assessing the long-term impact of Brexit on the Scottish economy 
Theoretical considerations from the literature on trade liberalisation (e.g. Eaton and Kortum, 1992; 
Baldwin and Venables, 1995) identify the likely long-term impacts of leaving the EU, but the size 
of, and interaction between, these effects is uncertain. Trade opens up businesses to new 
opportunities for exporting and investment. Labour mobility boosts labour supply helping to 
increase productivity and address demographic challenges in those countries – such as the UK (and 
Scotland) – with an ageing population. Competition helps efficiency, product specialisation and 
growth. And financial integration deepens and broadens capital markets. All of these are expected 
to be adversely impacted, in one way or another, by reduced integration with the EU. Further, 
some have argued that there may be additional dynamic effects coming through a reduction in 
productivity resulting from reduced openness (e.g., HM Treasury, 2016a). 
Theory therefore suggests that, in general, a retreat from liberalisation will have negative effects. 
However, in the case of Brexit there is at least one countervailing influence, even in the absence 
of new bilateral trade deals being struck, namely the net fiscal savings associated with leaving the 
EU. To resolve the uncertainty about the direction, and especially scale, of the various channels 
through which alternative forms of Brexit could impact the economy, it is necessary to use models 
of the UK economy.6 
In part because of their multi-sectoral structure, which can accommodate the differential impacts 
of trade barriers across industries, CGE models have been very widely applied to explore trade 
                                                          
6 In fact, as we discuss in Section 4, there are further ambiguities surrounding the system-wide output effects of 
barriers to imports from the EU. The balance of countervailing effects can only be determined by empirical 
modelling. 
7 
 
issues; although the focus has usually been on the consequences of stimulating, rather than 
reversing, trade liberalisation (e.g. Baldwin and Venables, 1995). PwC (2016) and Dhingra et al. 
(2016a, 2017a) provide the first CGE analyses of the impact of Brexit on the UK economy. PwC 
(2016) uses a flexible, full-employment model that estimates fairly modest GDP effects. Similarly, 
Dhingra et al. (2016a, 2017a) employ a flexible model of world trade, which is medium-term in 
orientation given the absence of any treatment of physical capital, and again finds comparatively 
modest Brexit impacts.  
As we have already noted, in order to identify the regional impacts of leaving the EU we have to 
tackle the issue of likely spatial spillovers. So the direct impacts on Scotland of lower integration 
with the EU are likely to be compounded by additional indirect and induced effects coming through 
the impact of Brexit on the RUK economy, given the importance of the RUK market for Scottish 
exports. Accordingly, it is essential to adopt an explicitly interregional analysis that can capture 
such spillovers.  
To assess the likely long-run implications of leaving, a helpful start is to look at the degree of trade 
integration between Scotland and the EU. Table 1 shows the value of Scottish exports to the EU 
for aggregate Services and Manufacturing, with the figures for the largest sectors within these 
categories separately identified. 7  
This information identifies those sectors that are most directly exposed to any change in the 
trading relationship with the EU. Many of the sectors with the largest EU exports are in 
manufacturing – including Food & Drink – but Scotland also has high levels of EU exports in 
                                                          
7 EU export data contained here http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Economy/Exports/ESSPublication/ESSAddTables  
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services, particularly those tied to professions, such as legal services, R&D activities, education, IT 
and finance.  
Many of these sectors are likely to be potential recipients of some special treatment at UK or 
Scottish levels. This might take the form of an offsetting policy response and/or guarantees of the 
sector’s interests being represented in any trade negotiations. However, the particular concerns 
of individual industries will vary and will depend on more than simply the size of the industry’s 
exposure to EU trade. Many other characteristics of the sector will be important, including the 
sensitivity of the sector to adjustments to competitiveness that arise through endogenous changes 
in the real exchange rate and wage rate. 
Table 1: Scottish EU Exports by Industry Sector, 2014 
 Value, £ M Share of EU exports in total international exports 
Total EU Exports 11,560 43% 
Manufacturing 6,695 47% 
Food & Drink 1,775 37% 
Coke, refined petroleum and chemical products 1,775 83% 
Machinery and Equipment NEC 650 37% 
Rubber & Plastic Products 575 71% 
Computer, electronic and optical products 555 50% 
Services 3,885 40% 
Wholesale & Retail 1,095 61% 
Professional Services 760 32% 
Administrative and Support Services 380 30% 
Transportation and Storage 355 63% 
Other 980 57% 
Source: Export Statistics Scotland (2016)8 
                                                          
8 There remain ongoing questions around the quality and completeness of export data for Scotland. See Lecca et al (2015). 
However, the Scottish Export Statistics remain the best source for information on Scottish exports. The need for greater coverage 
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Examining statistics such as those given in Table 1 is a useful exercise but is only a starting point. 
What is also needed is an assessment of how wider economic transmission mechanisms will feed 
through to the Scottish economy. Here a multi-regional CGE analysis is required to determine both 
the direction and scale of the impacts on both Scotland and RUK. Dhingra et al. (2017b), do provide 
estimates of impacts on NUTS 2 UK regions, but these are obtained by regionalising the UK results 
from their world trade model simulations (Dhingra et al.,2016a,2017b). These are unable to 
capture interregional interactions and spillovers.  Ideally, we would want a full interregional model 
for the UK, but data limitations are such that this is not currently feasible (without extensive guess 
work in relation to interregional trade flows and transfers). Our two-region CGE model of Scotland 
and rUK, allows us to undertake the first UK interregional CGE analysis of Brexit.  
Finally, it is important to note that this modelling exercise takes other policies as given.9 It is likely 
that policy will respond in the aftermath of leaving the EU. For example, the UK Government 
immediately relaxed its targets for reducing the fiscal deficit and has asserted that advantageous 
new trade deals with third countries will be possible post-Brexit. Further, it may be that R&D and 
other regional competitiveness policies might be pursued.10 However, we do not consider the 
effect of such potential policy initiatives. Our aim is simply to isolate the system-wide impact of 
leaving the EU.  
3. Model description 
                                                          
of Scottish trade should be an urgent priority for both the Scottish and UK Governments. FAI is currently involved in an Economic 
Statistics Centre of Excellence project on improving regional trade data. 
9 For example, we assume that both regional fiscal deficits are maintained at their initial levels. 
10 However, the literature on liberalisation would suggest that an adverse effect on R&D from trade reductions. 
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In order to capture spillover effects between Scotland and the rest of the UK and to minimise 
aggregation biases, we adopt a multi-sectoral, two-region Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
model of the UK economy, AMOSRUK.11 The model includes two endogenous regions – Scotland 
and RUK – and two exogenous regions – the rest of the EU (REU) and the rest of the world (ROW) 
and it is parameterised on an interregional Social Accounting Matrix for Scotland and RUK for 
2010.12 
There are three transactor groups in each region – households, firms and government – and 
eighteen productive sectors.  
Firms and trade 
In each sector, local intermediate inputs are combined with imports from the other region and the 
rest of the world (EU and non-EU) via an Armington link (Armington, 1969); value added is 
produced by combination of capital and labour. Intermediate input is then combined with value 
added to determine the sector’s gross output. This is done using a nested CES production function 
with an elasticity of substitution or 0.3 (Harris, 1989).  
The price of imports and the interest rate are both set exogenously in perfectly integrated 
national/international markets.  Regional exports are determined through conventional 
(Armington) trade functions. Non-price determinants of export demand from the rest of the world 
are taken to be exogenous. Export demand to the other UK region is fully endogenous, depending 
                                                          
11 AMOSRUK is effectively a multi-sectoral, multi-regional variant of the disaggregated Layard, Nickell and Jackman model (1991, 
chapter 6), which incorporates imperfect competition in the regional labour market. 
12 The SAM is produced by the Fraser of Allander Institute and can be downloaded from 
http://www.strath.ac.uk/business/economics/fraserofallanderinstitute/research/economicmodelling/ 
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not only on relative prices, but also on all elements of intermediate and final demand in the other 
region. 
Imports from ROW are disaggregated between imports from non-EU and from EU countries (see 
Figure 1). This structure is adopted for import of intermediate input as well as for household and 
investment demand.  
Figure 1. Schematic of the nested Armington system  
 
The Armington equation at each level and for each component of demand takes the following 
standard form: 
𝐷𝐷1𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝐷𝐷2𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = ��𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖1𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖2 � ∙ � 𝑃𝑃2𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃1𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡��
1
1−𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴
 
(1) 
where D1 and D2 stand for demand for goods and services from two different origins; P1 and P2 
stand for respective prices; 𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴 is the import elasticity of substitution between output from origins 
1 and 2 and it set to 2 (Gibson, 1990); 𝛿𝛿1 and 𝛿𝛿2 are the shares in the Armington function. 
Import channel
UK
Scotland RUK
ROW
REU Non-EU
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Exports to every destination depend on relative prices and an elasticity of substitution between 
outputs from different origins. Export equations take the following form: 
𝐸𝐸1𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸1����𝑖𝑖 ∙ �𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸1𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 (2) 
where E1 is the volume of exports to destination 1, 𝐸𝐸1���� is the baseline level of exports to 
destination 1, PE1 is an exogenous price at destination 1, PR is domestic price and 𝜎𝜎𝑥𝑥  is export 
elasticity of substitution between outputs from different origins.  
Trade from/to the rest of the world is separated into EU and non-EU regions using the data on 
export and import patterns from the Trade in Value Added (TiVA) data for the UK and Scottish 
Export Statistics. Since detailed data on trade partners for imports to Scotland are unavailable we 
use the UK sectoral proportions to distribute total imports.  
Investment  
Investment demand from each sector is a proportion of the difference between actual and desired 
capital stock (Eq. A.58), where desired capital stock is derived by firm’s cost minimisation (Eq. 
A.59). In the long-run equilibrium actual and desired capital stocks are equal. 
Labour market 
Wages are determined within each region using a regional wage curve (Blanchflower and Oswald, 
1994) based on the econometrically-parameterised relationship in Layard et al (1991). The 
effective population constraint applies at the regional level, with regional real wages reflecting the 
tightness of the regional labour market, measured as inversely related to the regional 
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unemployment rate. In our default simulation it is assumed that there is no international or 
interregional migration.13 Therefore population and potential labour supply in each region remains 
unchanged during the simulation period.  
Government 
We assume that Scotland and RUK maintain a fixed fiscal deficit in the face of the Brexit shocks. 
Any variation in tax revenues are absorbed by changes in both Governments’ current spending. 14 
The complete model listing is given in Appendix B. 
4. Scenarios 
4.1 Alternative variants of Brexit 
Given the uncertainties surrounding the form that Brexit might take, we need to consider 
alternative futures, reflecting a range of different possible trading relationships. Since the 
referendum some options have become less likely, such as remaining a member of the Single 
Market, but the precise form of the future UK relationship with the EU is still unknown.  
We explicitly model two main effects that leaving the EU will have on the UK economy. These are 
the imposition of additional constraints to UK trade with the EU and the repatriation of fiscal 
                                                          
13 However, we do briefly discuss the importance of migration in Section 4, and report some simulation results 
allowing for migration in Section 5. For interregional migration we employ the estimated net migration function 
reported in Layard et al (1991), which relates net in migration to real wage and unemployment rate differentials. We 
also note the limiting case of international migration in the absence of barriers to such movements, which implies 
fixed real wage rates in both regions. 
14 Of course, this implies that government spending falls in response to a Brexit-induced decline in activity and in tax 
revenues, exacerbating the contraction. Under the new Fiscal Framework, Scotland’s spending is now dependent on 
its income tax revenues. The UK could alternatively borrow more, but the ultimate direction of effects would be the 
same. 
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contributions that the UK currently makes to the EU. We do not explicitly model the potential 
migration, FDI and productivity effects identified in the literature in anything like the same detail 
as the trade effects because their scale is so uncertain, but we do comment on their likely impact.  
We model two illustrative leave scenarios for the UK-EU interactions, both of which involve: 
• Stopping or reducing financial contributions to the EU;  
• Ending the free movement of people; 
• retaining all trade deals between the EU and third countries 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU 
This scenario assumes that the UK: 
• leaves the Single Market and customs union and therefore is subject to an ‘economic 
border’ including ‘rules of origin’; 
• negotiates a free trade agreement with the EU, which will be less comprehensive than 
membership of the Single Market; reduces its fiscal contribution to the EU 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) scenario 
This is the “default” leave scenario, which would apply if a better deal cannot be secured. This is 
the “no deal” or “hard Brexit” scenario, which assumes that the UK: 
• falls back to the WTO rules for trade with the EU; 
• faces tariffs on trade with the EU; 
• stops making financial contributions to the EU 
15 
 
Clearly these scenarios are simplifications of any post-Brexit arrangements the UK will actually 
secure. Indeed, there is no single arrangement that can be taken off-the-shelf and applied 
immediately. The aim of these scenarios is, however, to provide an illustration of the direction and 
scale of possible impacts. Each scenario implies a different degree of integration with the EU. In 
the stylised ‘FTA scenario’ for example, the trading relationship is more open, although barriers to 
trade are significantly higher than within the Single Market. The ‘WTO scenario’ assumes no special 
trading relationship between the UK and the EU so barriers to trade in principle are higher.  
It should be noted that all scenarios assume no change in the policy stance. In the reported 
simulations both regions therefore maintain their initial fiscal deficits. Given that public sector 
revenues will typically fall in response to an adverse economic shock, such as Brexit implies, this 
requires corresponding contractions in government expenditure, which exacerbate the 
contractionary impact (at least in the absence of the reduction in the net fiscal contribution after 
leaving the EU). Over the longer term, policy responses by the UK and/or Scottish Governments 
are likely, but these are so uncertain that we adhere to the simplest assumption of no change in 
the fiscal deficit in either region. 
All simulations presented here are timed from the moment when the agreement on Brexit is 
implemented; that is from the end of any transitionary adjustment period that may be agreed.15 
Trade shock 
We use estimates of the impact on UK trade under these two stylised scenarios reported by the 
National Institute for Economic and Social Research (NIESR) in Ebell (2016). Ebell uses an empirical 
                                                          
15 This reflects our use of the myopic version of the interregional model of the UK.  
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gravity model and the most recent available data for 42 countries to estimate the effect of 
membership of the European Economic Area (EEA)16 and other, looser, FTAs on trade in goods and 
services. This methodology is similar to that used by other contributions in the literature and 
arrives at effects of comparable size (Baier et al, 2008; Ceglowski, 2006; Egger et al, 2011). 
However, Ebell (2016) uses the most recent data, differentiates trade in goods and services, and 
explicitly models the effects of EEA membership and other FTAs.  
Table 2 provides estimates of the reduction in trade with the EU for goods and services under each 
scenario. These are substantial17. Due to the way the model was specified in Ebell (2016) with one 
dummy variable representing the overall effect on bilateral trade, this dummy captures three 
groups of effects: 1) tariff barriers; 2) non-tariff barriers; and 3) border effects. The first component 
is often discussed and is easy to describe and understand. In simple terms, after leaving the Single 
Market the UK might be subject to tariffs. In the WTO case they will be the most favoured nation 
(MFN) tariffs. They constitute a smaller part of the trade restrictions. In 2014 the trade weighted 
average tariff applied by the EU was 2.7% (WTO, 2016) 
 
Table 2: Impact of various post-Brexit scenarios on Scotland’s exports 
 Estimated reduction in EU trade 
 Goods Services 
FTA Scenario -40%18 -63% 
WTO Scenario -61% -63% 
                                                          
16 28 countries of the EU plus Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein 
17 The quantitative impact we derive ultimately depends upon the scale and composition of the initial shock. Different studies use 
different estimates of the possible effect of Brexit on trade, although the scale tends to be similar. Of course, any quantitative 
results are sensitive to the precise size of the applied shock and it is therefore entirely possible to model different shocks (larger 
or smaller). We have tested for a wide range of scenarios and whilst the quantitative impacts change, the qualitative impacts and 
relative scale of the effects between regions, sectors and transmission channels found here still hold. 
18 We use arithmetic averages of the rage of estimated effects (using different model specifications) from Ebell (2016). 
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Source: Ebell (2016) 
Non-tariff barriers represent infrastructure (customs queue and checks), bureaucratic (rules of 
origin) and regulatory (product standards) restrictions. Non-tariff barriers are usually estimated to 
be more important than tariff barriers in restricting trade. Non-tariff barriers include the customs 
controls for goods being exported to the EU19. ‘Rules of Origin’ require exporters to obtain 
certificates to demonstrate the domestic content of their exports. The cost of these restrictions 
can be significant, particularly for smaller firms and businesses that rely on complex cross-border 
supply chains. Firms trading with the EU have to submit customs declarations and there can be 
complications with VAT arrangements when products cross borders. This may have implications 
for costs, efficiency and time competitiveness20. 
The third component – border effects – is much less well understood. It reflects the observation 
that regions within a country trade with each other much more that similar regions across 
countries (McCallum, 1995; Wei, 1996; Helliwell; 1997; Evans, 2001; Anderson and Van Wincoop, 
2001). These unexplained border effects are usually very large, and attributable to unobservable, 
perhaps psychological, effects. 
We interpret the reduction in trade associated with looser integration with the EU as a change in 
explicit (tariffs) and implicit (non-tariff barriers and border effects) prices. All three groups of 
factors will make it costlier for the UK to trade with the EU (and vice-versa). To introduce these 
                                                          
19The relevant form has more than 50 boxes requesting information, and the guidance is 78 pages long. It typically requires 
evidence proving products are either made inside the EEA, or comply with a number of product specific rules. For information see 
- http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-ontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L:2005:321:FULL&from=en 
20 HM Treasure estimate that over half of UK goods exports to the EU would need to be certified as complying with rules of origin 
requirements in order to continue to receive tariff-free access into the Single Market. 
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changes into the model we shock both the EU import price in the import equation (1) and the EU 
export price in the export equation (2). We calibrate the price shocks to achieve the overall long-
run reductions in EU exports and imports reported in Table 2. 
 
The imposition of the tariff (and tariff-equivalent-non-tariff barriers) on our exports to the EU 
reduces the competitiveness of UK goods within the EU and leads to a reduction in the price 
received by exporters and in the demand for those exports. The contraction in demand for UK 
produced goods leads to a reduction in economic activity and domestic prices and wages, with the 
latter pressures mitigating the contraction to a degree through improving competitiveness relative 
to ROW.  
The rise in tariff and non-tariff barriers on imports increases the domestic prices of imports and 
reduces the demand for them. However, the macroeconomic consequences are more complex 
than for exports since there are countervailing effects on economic activity. The rise in the relative 
price of imported consumption goods tends to stimulate demand for domestically produced 
consumption goods, and this would tend to increase economic activity. However, there are two 
countervailing forces. First, the rise in the prices of imported intermediate goods from the EU 
constitutes an adverse supply shock, which tends to reduce UK competitiveness directly through 
their impact on the prices of domestically produced goods. Additionally, the rise in prices puts 
upward pressure on wages, further reducing competitiveness. In the UK case, as we shall see, the 
adverse supply shock associated with the rise in import prices dominates the positive stimulus 
from consumption, so that output and employment contract. 
19 
 
The combined impact of the export and import price shocks on output and employment is 
therefore unambiguously negative, but the impact on prices depends on the relative strengths of 
the export and import shocks. 
The effect of the tariff barriers will be felt immediately after their introduction. Some non-tariff 
barriers associated with the formal border (e.g., rules of origin, customs checks and additional 
paperwork) and others where regulations are restrictive (e.g. passporting in financial services) will 
also start immediately. Some other non-tariff barriers will take time to accumulate, for example 
border effects associated with networking, information availability, and search for partners. To 
account for that, and the fact that we now have a formal acknowledgement of a transition period, 
we introduce the shock gradually over ten years.  
We apply universal price shocks across all sectors. However, the resulting trade impacts vary across  
sectors, depending on each sector’s exposure to EU trade through both exports and imports. 
Overall RUK is more directly exposed to EU trade through both import and export channels. Total 
EU imports constitute 7% of total output in Scotland and 9% in RUK, whilst EU exports make up 4% 
of total output in Scotland and 7% in RUK. Also RUK is a much larger trading partner for Scotland. 
Both RUK imports and exports comprise 15% of total Scottish output but Scottish trade makes up 
only 1% of RUK output. Not surprisingly, these differences have a significant impact on our 
simulation results. In particular, while the macroeconomic impacts identified above should be 
apparent for both Scotland and RUK, the relatively greater exposure of the latter to trade will result 
in a greater contraction there. This asymmetric regional impact of Brexit creates incentives for 
internal migration, which we discuss briefly below. 
Fiscal contributions 
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In the Brexit referendum a key element of the debate was the return to the UK of the net fiscal 
contribution made to the EU, which stood at £8.6bn in 2014. This takes account of the UK rebate 
and other receipts, such as those distributed through the CAP and EU structural funds, and 
assumes that the UK Government replaces all EU expenditures made in the UK. 
We model the positive effects resulting from the reduced EU contribution as higher UK public 
expenditure (even after maintaining existing EU spending in both Scotland and RUK). The extent 
of the positive fiscal effects depends upon the negotiated settlement. Both Norway (a member of 
EEA) and Switzerland (a member of EFTA) make contributions to the EU budget despite not being 
members of the EU.  We consider the UK benefits from the full saving of current net EU 
contributions in both scenarios. Of course, any realistic settlement under the FTA scenario is likely 
to be less favourable, but this provides us with an upper limit estimate of the fiscal benefits that 
would be associated with a WTO outcome. Assuming that the fiscal stimulus is allocated to UK 
regions on a population share basis  implies that the Scottish Government’s budget increases by 
£690m (8% of the total UK contribution) and the RUK budget increases by £7.91bn.21,22 Throughout 
we assume that both the UK and Scottish Governments spend the additional resource (rather than 
using it, for example, to reduce their respective deficits).23  
Migration 
                                                          
21 Note that this sharing only applies to the net fiscal saving. Scotland’s higher share of agricultural subsidies, for 
example, is retained given the UK government’s commitment to maintaining current EU spending in the UK. 
22 Scotland’s share of UK public expenditure in 2015/16 was 9% (GERS) whilst Scotland’s population (2014) and GDP (2015) share 
was 8%.  
23 We do not explore variations on the fiscal settlement under FTA in detail, since our results are not sensitive to the 
fiscal settlement.  
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Migration was one of the most important issues during the Brexit debate. Currently it appears that 
the UK government is willing to sacrifice access to the Single Market in order to be able to control 
and restrict immigration from the EU There is a large and growing body of literature on the impact 
of migration on the UK's economy concentrating mostly on the effects on the labour market and 
public finances (Lemos and Portes, 2008; Manacorda et al., 2012; Wadsworth, 2015; Nickell and 
Saleheen, 2008; 2015; Sriskandarajah et al., 2005; Gott and Johnson, 2002; Dustmann et al., 2010; 
Dustmann and Fratinni, 2013).  
We have already noted the asymmetric impact of Brexit on Scotland and RUK. Interregional 
migration would reinforce this tendency since real wage and unemployment rate differentials, the 
drivers of these flows, would favour net in-migration to Scotland from RUK. The contraction in RUK 
would be exacerbated, whilst that in Scotland would be mitigated, by interregional migration 
flows. However, modelling the international migration response to Brexit presents a major 
challenge, since the terms of the negotiated settlement are as yet unknown. However, since 
relative to ROW real wage and unemployment rates move adversely in both UK regions, there 
would likely be pressure for international outmigration from both Scotland and RUK, exacerbating 
the contraction in both. 
Given the uncertainty over migration – especially international migration – post-Brexit, our default 
model specification assumes zero net migration flows. However, we explore a number of model 
simulations that provide estimates of the possible scale of such flows. 24 
                                                          
24 The model used in this paper does not, however, incorporate the heterogeneity of the workforce required to 
conduct a detailed analysis of restrictions on international migration. See Lisenkova and Sanchez-Martinez (2016), 
who analyse the impact of a potential reduction in net migration from the EU after Brexit using an overlapping 
generations (OLG) CGE.  
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Productivity 
In their analysis, HM Treasury (2016a) argued that leaving the EU would have a negative impact 
on labour productivity, based on research suggesting that more open economies are also more 
productive. The productivity assumption has not been universally adopted; indeed it remains 
controversial since the scale of the effect is so uncertain. For completeness however, we briefly 
explore the impact of Brexit-induced adverse productivity shock. 
4.2 Simulation set-up 
As discussed in Section 4.1, the export and import price shocks that we simulate in AMOSRUK are 
calibrated to generate, as closely as possible, the trade reductions reported in Table 2 for the FTA 
and WTO scenarios. A perfect match is difficult to achieve since both import and export volumes 
are endogenous and influence one another. Also, as we have seen, the two regions have different 
exposures to trade with the EU and thus react to the same price shock differently. All types of 
trade restrictions (tariff and non-tariff barriers and border effects) are expressed in the form of 
“equivalent” tariffs.  
The exogenous price changes that we simulate are reported in Table 3. We vary the size of the 
shocks between exports and imports and between goods and services (and recall that the FTA does 
not apply to the latter), but apply shocks of the same size to Scotland and RUK in each category. 
The permanent price shocks are introduced gradually over a ten-year period. For example the 
import price of goods in the WTO scenario is increased by 7.0% initially, rising to 70% in period 10, 
and then maintained at that level. 
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Table 3. The permanent import and export price shocks attributable to Brexit under the WTO 
(FTA) scenarios (% changes) 
 Period 1 Period 5 Period 10 
Export price of goods -3.5 (-2.2) -17.5 (-11.0) -35.0 (-22.0) 
Export price of services -4.0 (-4.0) -20.0 (-20.0) -40.0 (-40.0) 
Import price of goods 7.0 (3.0) 35.0 (15.0) 70.0 (30.0) 
Import price of services 5.5 (5.5) 27.5 (27.5) 55.0 (55.0) 
 
Import price shocks are equivalent to the import tariffs (without the revenues).25 Interpreting the 
export price shocks is less straightforward. They show loss of competitiveness of domestic goods 
relative to other exports to the EU. If the EU export market price is lower UK goods become less 
competitive. The 22%-40% of export price shocks in the FTA scenario are equivalent to a 28%-
67%26 UK export tariff (or EU import tariff). The 35%-40% of export price shocks in the WTO 
scenario are equivalent to a 54%-67% UK export tariff (or EU import tariff). Thus, tariff equivalent 
shocks are similar in magnitude to achieve comparable reductions in export and imports.  
                                                          
25 However, here they partially reflect the impact of increases in non-trade barriers on the real costs of trade. 
26 To calculate equivalent export tariff we divide domestic price in the base year (normalised to 1) by the resultant 
EU export price. For example, 1/(1-0.22)=1.28.  
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5. Results 
We first report the results of the export and import price shocks reflecting the combined effects 
of tariff and non-tariff barriers created by Brexit. We then consider the likely impact of the net 
fiscal saving. The possible impacts of Brexit on migration flows are then discussed. Throughout we 
report real consumption and real government expenditure per capita.27 
The trade shocks 
It is clear from Table 3 that FTA and WHO scenarios are qualitatively very similar; only the size of 
the price shocks differs. Not surprisingly, therefore, the results are qualitatively similar, differing 
only in terms of the scale of impacts. Here we concentrate primarily on the case of a hard Brexit 
(WTO), but note the impact of the “softer” exit (FTA) would be on key results.28 
As explained in Section 4.1 Brexit is a combination of price changes that generates a range of 
complex responses, some of which are conflicting. Accordingly, it is easiest to understand its 
overall impact by first examining the impacts of export and import price changes separately. Table 
4 summarises the results of applying only the export price shocks in the first two rows of Table 3 
above, for the WTO scenario under our default assumption of zero net (international and 
interregional) migration. All figures are expressed as percentage changes relative to the baseline 
and are reported for the short run (SR), where capital stocks are fixed, ten years after the 
                                                          
27 Real consumption per capita is often used as the basis for welfare measures in CGE models. 
28 We also report the FTA results in Appendix A. 
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introduction of the shock, and for the long run (LR) where capital stocks are fully adjusted and the 
economy has returned to steady state equilibrium.29  
 
 
 
Table 4: WTO scenario applied only to export prices (% changes relative to baseline) 
Periods SR 5 10 LR 
GDP -0.0  -0.5  -1.6  -3.0  
Total Exports -0.6  -3.2  -6.7  -8.3  
Exports of goods to the EU -5.1  -25.7  -50.5  -51.8  
Exports of services to the EU -6.1  -29.8  -57.2  -57.5  
Exports to non-EU 1.8 9.0 17.5 16.1 
Exports to RUK  0.0  -0.3  -1.4  -3.2  
Total imports -0.6  -3.4  -6.8  -8.0  
Imports of goods from the EU -1.5  -7.3  -13.8  -14.3  
Imports of services from the EU -1.6  -8.3  -15.6  -16.4  
Imports from non-EU -1.7 -7.9 -14.6 -14.9 
Imports from RUK 0.4  1.2  1.5  -0.3  
CPI -0.8  -3.9  -7.3  -6.9  
Employment -0.0  -0.4  -1.2  -2.3  
Real wage -0.0  -0.7  -1.8  -3.1  
Consumption  -0.2  -1.4  -3.3  -4.6  
Government expenditure 0.4 1.5 2.0 -0.3 
Source: simulation results 
The export price shock leads to lower external demand for domestic goods and to a fall in prices. 
Initially this reflects excess capacity and falling rental rates, especially in export sectors, but the fall 
in demand for goods and services has a negative impact on the labour market. Employment falls, 
the unemployment rate rises, and real wages are pushed down, depressing consumption. CPI falls 
                                                          
29 We abstract here from any induced migration within the UK. Since Scotland is impacted less than RUK allowance 
for internal migration would tend to mitigate the adverse impact on the Scottish economy (and add to the 
contraction in RUK) (Roy et al, 2016.) 
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continuously and is 7.3% below the base value by period 10. Improvement in competitiveness vis 
a vis ROW arising from the fall in prices leads to increases in exports to non-EU countries, which 
mitigate some of the negative effects. Capital stocks gradually contract until capacity is ultimately 
at its desired level, in each sector, in long-run equilibrium. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: WTO scenario applied only to import prices (% changes relative to baseline) 
Periods SR 5 10 LR 
GDP -0.3  -2.0  -4.4  -6.2  
Total Exports -0.4  -2.0  -4.3  -6.4  
Exports of goods to the EU -2.1  -8.4  -14.1  -15.5  
Exports of services to the EU -0.9  -5.1  -10.2  -12.2  
Exports to non-EU -1.7 -7.6 -13.3 -14.8 
Exports to RUK  0.4  1.0  0.6  -1.7  
Total imports -1.9  -7.3  -12.0  -13.2  
Imports of goods from the EU -7.7  -30.1  -47.1  -47.9  
Imports of services from the EU -9.4  -35.3  -54.2  -54.2  
Imports from non-EU 2.2 10.9 19.8 19.3 
Imports from RUK 0.2  0.5  0.0  -2.0  
CPI 1.0  5.1  9.5  10.4  
Employment -0.5  -2.5  -5.0  -6.4  
Real wage -0.9  -3.8  -6.9  -8.3  
Consumption  -0.8  -3.3  -5.9  -7.2  
Government expenditure -1.9 -8.7 -15.6 -18.3 
Source: simulation results 
As expected, the import price shock leads to a rise in prices in Table 5. As already discussed, the 
import price shock induces a number of partially countervailing effects, reflecting imports’  three 
uses as intermediate inputs, household consumption and investment goods. Consumption, 
investment and domestic prices all rise due to increased import prices. Intermediates exert the 
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strongest impact because this adversely affects competitiveness and domestic (e.g., household 
consumption) as well as export demand, so economic activity declines. The figures in Table 6 show 
that in this simulation under the WTO scenario domestic prices rise by 9.5% by year 10 and GDP 
and employment have declined by 4.4% and 5.0% respectively over the same time period. This 
compares to the 1.6% and 1.2% falls in the same variable with the export price shock reported in 
Table 5. 
It might seem counterintuitive that import restrictions would have a stronger negative impact on 
the economy. The populist view of protectionism is that it is likely to have significant benefits for 
the home economy. However, Caplan (2007) argues that this is an example of voter irrationality 
and an emotional, zero-sum attitude to trade and interaction in general with outsiders 
(foreigners). The results in Table 6 suggest that this view might have some traction. 
Table 6: WTO scenario applied only to imports for household consumption, with a fixed nominal 
wage (% changes relative to baseline) 
Periods SR 5 10 LR 
GDP -0.1  -0.0  0.6  2.2  
Total Exports -0.0  0.2  0.8  2.2  
Exports of goods to the EU -0.3  -1.0  -1.2  0.0  
Exports of services to the EU -0.2  -0.9  -1.2  -0.0  
Exports to non-EU -0.3 -0.9 -1.2 0.0 
Exports to RUK  0.1  0.8  1.9  3.4  
Total imports -0.6  -1.7  -2.3  -1.5  
Imports of goods from the EU -1.2  -4.1  -5.9  -5.8  
Imports of services from the EU -3.6  -13.1  -19.6  -19.1  
imports from RUK 0.2  1.0  2.2  3.3  
Imports from non-EU 0.2 1.3 2.4 2.8 
CPI 0.4  1.8  2.9  2.3  
Employment -0.1  -0.0  0.6  2.1  
Real wage -0.4  -1.8  -2.9  -2.3  
Consumption  -0.3  -0.9  -0.9  0.3  
Government expenditure -0.8 -2.8 -3.7 -1.5 
Source: simulation results 
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The simulation results reported in Table 6 provide a decomposition of the import price effect, to 
focus on the transmission mechanism through consumption. First, import prices are only increased 
for consumption goods and services. The prices of imported intermediates and investment goods 
are unaffected. Second, the nominal wage is held constant. Although we initially observe very 
small negative GDP and employment effects, by year 10 there is a 0.6% increase in GDP and 
employment. In this case there is no direct feed through from import restrictions to domestic 
product prices. Substitution by consumers away from imports (and international trade) to 
domestic goods and services (and interregional trade) stimulates domestic output. However, this 
positive effect comes at the cost of falling real wages, which decline by 2.9% by year 10. Under the 
bargained real wage closure, the impact again becomes negative: even without the impact on 
intermediates, the adverse supply effect of the import price rise dominates the beneficial 
consumption effect on economic activity.  
However, in fact, imports include intermediates and the import price rise imparts an adverse 
supply shock to the Scottish economy, reinforced where wages are determined in real terms, as 
they are in our default model. Overall, increasing barriers to imports from the EU exacerbates the 
contraction in both Scotland and RUK. 
These findings have interesting, and perhaps surprising policy implications. Outside of negotiations 
the UK has no influence over the export restrictions it will face after leaving the EU. However, 
import restrictions are, to some extent, under the control of the UK government. Even if WTO rules 
determine the level of tariffs imposed on imports of goods and services from the EU after Brexit, 
the UK can choose what type of controls to impose at the border. It can be argued that, if it so 
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chooses, the UK government could allow continued open access for the EU imports in the UK 
market. Over-time non-tariff barriers and border effects will start to accumulate, but this might 
take years or even decades. In public debate protectionist measures are often thought to benefit 
the home (tariff-imposing) country. Our results suggest that this is not the case for the UK, at least 
as far as trade with the EU is concerned. Even if the EU does not grant the UK a preferential trade 
deal, adoption by the UK of a more lenient attitude towards EU imports would be in its own 
interests: “retaliation” here would be self-defeating, and exacerbate the scale of the contraction 
in both Scottish and RUK economies. 
Of course, Brexit in fact involves the simultaneous implementation of both export and import price 
shocks (as in Table 3), with the latter applying to imported intermediates and investment as well 
as consumption.  Table 7 reports results the overall Brexit results for the WTO scenario under our 
default model assumptions of a bargained real wage and no migration.  
Table 7: WTO scenario, all price shocks applied (% changes relative to baseline) 
Periods SR 5 10 LR LR (RUK) 
GDP -0.3  -2.4  -5.8  -9.7  -13.0  
Total Exports -0.9  -5.0  -10.2  -14.5  -24.4  
Exports of goods to the EU -7.0  -32.0  -57.6  -59.7  -60.6  
Exports of services to the EU -6.9  -33.4  -61.7  -63.2  -60.5  
Exports to non-EU 0.0 0.7 1.7 -2.3 1.8  
Exports to RUK  0.4  0.9  -0.4  -5.6  -3.3  
Total imports -2.5  -9.9  -16.5  -19.5  -35.6  
Imports of goods from the EU -9.1  -34.9  -53.9  -55.1  -59.6  
Imports of services from the EU -10.9  -40.4  -60.9  -61.3  -65.2  
Imports from non-EU 0.5 2.4 3.1 1.9 -62.4  
Imports from RUK 0.6  1.9  1.9  -3.3  -5.6  
CPI 0.2  0.9  1.4  3.2  -0.3  
Employment -0.5  -2.8  -5.9  -9.2  -12.5  
Real wage -0.9  -4.0  -7.2  -9.9  -11.5  
Consumption  -0.9  -4.4  -8.2  -11.1  -14.6  
Government expenditure -1.5 -6.9 -12.7 -18.6 -26.6 
Source: simulation results 
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As we have seen the two types of trade shocks have countervailing effects on prices; here the 
upward pressure on prices from imports predominates. Combining the two shocks reinforces the 
negative effects of each on exports, GDP and employment, given the nature and scale of imports 
from the EU. Scotland does not now obtain the full benefit from the improvement in 
competitiveness vis a vis non-EU countries that it would enjoy if only export prices are shocked.  
As expected given the analysis in Section 4, there are substantial contractions in real consumption 
and real wages, with rises in the CPI reflecting the net effect of increases in import prices and falls 
in export prices.30 After 10 years GDP is down nearly 6% in Scotland (and 7.4% in RUK). The WTO 
results reported here are, in general, a magnified version of the figures from the FTA simulation, 
which suggest that the softer Brexit would be associated with smaller, but still very substantial, 
reductions in GDP, of 4% in Scotland and 5% in RUK (after 10 years).31 The overall scale of the EU 
trade reduction leads to significant adverse impacts on the Scottish (and RUK) economies even 
under the FTA scenario; a hard Brexit makes matters worse. 
The benefits of using a multi-regional model can be seen by comparing the results presented above 
with a simulation which only applies shocks to Scotland. Between 17% and 18% of the long-run 
effect on GDP and employment is due to the spillovers from the RUK. Ignoring them by using a 
single-region model for simulations would significantly underestimate the negative effect of Brexit 
on Scotland. In general all negative effects are stronger in RUK than in Scotland due to greater 
                                                          
30 Recall that our default assumption is zero net migration, so that e.g. percentage changes in real consumption also 
indicate percentage changes in real consumption per capita; welfare declines in both Scotland and RUK  (here and 
across all the trade simulations). 
31 See Appendix 1. 
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exposure of the former to EU trade. Also RUK is the largest trading partner for Scotland and 
changes in its price level are modest compared with the EU price changes. This benefits Scotland.  
Overall, we estimate the impacts of Brexit through trade to be rather more severe than the CGE 
analyses of PwC (2016) and Dhingra et al. (2017). The first – and major - part of the explanation is 
simply the scale of the shock to trade flows following Brexit. We base this on Ebell (2016) because 
these are the best estimates of their kind, focussed explicitly on Brexit. Second, we have a model 
that allows adjustment to a long-run equilibrium in which all capital stocks are ultimately at their 
desired levels; it is clear from our simulations that the impact of Brexit typically increases with the 
time interval considered. Third our model has some features that are closer to conventional 
macro-economic models in capturing aspects of imperfect competition in the labour market, and 
in having investment independent of savings and driven by profitability.  Estimates of Brexit 
impacts from conventional macroeconomic models tend to be greater than those from other CGE 
models. (HM Treasury, 2016). Fourth, we consider import as well as export price effects, whereas 
others have tended to focus only on exports (e.g. NIESR, 2016), perhaps on the basis that these 
are (at least to a much greater extent) under the influence of the UK Government. As we have 
seen, contrary to populist assertions, we find that “retaliation” with respect to our imports from 
the EU significantly reduces economic activity and welfare: indeed we find this to be even more 
important in governing the overall impact of Brexit than the impact on our exports to the EU. 
Fiscal effects 
Table 8 illustrates the effect of the fiscal stimulus that results from discontinuing the entire EU net 
fiscal contribution, and distributing the saving between Scotland and RUK on the basis of 
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population shares.32 Of course, currently both the total net fiscal saving, and its distribution across 
regions are unknown.  
Table 8: Fiscal effects: long-term (% changes relative to baseline) 
Periods SR 5 10 LR 
GDP 0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1  
Total Exports -0.7  -0.8  -0.9  -0.9  
Exports of goods to the EU -0.8  -1.2  -1.3  -1.3  
Exports of services to the EU -2.2  -1.8  -1.7  -1.7  
Exports to RUK  -0.4  -0.5  -0.5  -0.6  
Total imports 1.1  0.7  0.7  0.7  
Imports of goods from the EU 1.4  1.0  1.0  1.0  
Imports of services from the EU 2.5  1.8  1.7  1.7  
Imports from RUK 0.1  0.0  -0.0  -0.0  
CPI 1.0  0.7  0.7  0.7  
Employment 0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3  
Real wage 0.7  0.6  0.5  0.5  
Consumption  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.5  
Government consumption 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 
Source: simulation results  
 
Following the increase in public expenditure there is an increase in prices. This initially reflects 
both capacity constraints and increased real wages as employment increases, reducing the 
unemployment rate. Negative competitiveness effects arising from the price increases, however, 
dampen the positive stimulus. By year 10, GDP and employment have increased by 0.2% and 0.3% 
                                                          
32 For simplicity we assume that the government expenditures only impact initially on demand. If the expenditure 
has beneficial supply side effects (e.g. spending on training) then these results underestimate the beneficial impact 
of the fiscal savings. However, recall that government expenditure is falling in all the analyses of the trade shocks; if 
that expenditure has supply side effects our analysis underestimates the scale of the likely contraction. See e.g. 
Lecca et al (2017). 
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respectively, and whilst public and household expenditure has increased, the positive demand 
effect is dampened by some crowding out of exports.  
How reasonable are the assumptions on which the results of Table 8 are based? Since the UK 
Government is committed to maintaining gross EU expenditures, so that, for example, Scotland’s 
greater share of agricultural subsidies would be maintained, at least initially, our assumption about 
the regional distribution of net fiscal savings seems a reasonable first approximation. However, 
the assumption that the whole of the current net fiscal transfer would be saved post Brexit is 
unrealistic except under the WTO scenario. However, as can be seen from the results in Table 8, 
the overall impacts of Brexit prove to be insensitive to any reasonable estimate of the scale of 
fiscal savings, given the extremely modest stimulus generated by what is the maximum possible 
fiscal saving. Accordingly, we do not pursue it further.33 
Note that these are the effects of the fiscal stimulus in isolation. This simulation does not take into 
account the trade impacts set out above. Whilst there is a modest boost to the economy, this is 
much smaller, even in the unrealistic case (except under the WTO scenario) in which the UK saves 
its entire current net fiscal contribution, than the negative effects from reduced EU trade identified 
in Tables 3 and 4. 
Combined effect of the trade shocks and fiscal effects 
Table 9 illustrates the impact of Brexit on Scottish economy under the WTO model combining trade 
effects and the maximum estimate of the potential fiscal stimulus. Adding the fiscal  stimulus leads 
                                                          
33 A reviewer suggested that assumptions that the UK’s fiscal contribution after leaving the EU could be based on the 
per capita contributions in the Norway or Switzerland cases. This would have only a negligible impact, however, on 
our overall results. 
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to a slight reduction in the overall negative effects, but fiscal savings do not come close to 
offsetting the adverse trade effects of Brexit.  
Table 9: WTO scenario, all price and fiscal shocks (% changes relative to baseline) 
Periods SR 5 10 LR 
GDP -0.1  -2.2  -5.6  -9.4  
Total Exports -1.7  -5.7  -10.9  -15.2  
Exports of goods to the EU -7.8  -32.8  -58.2  -60.2  
Exports of services to the EU -8.9  -34.6  -62.4  -63.9  
Exports to non-EU -1.3  -0.9  -0.0  -3.9  
Exports to RUK  0.0  0.4  -0.9  -5.9  
Total imports -1.4  -9.3  -16.0  -19.0  
Imports of goods from the EU -7.8  -34.2  -53.4  -54.6  
Imports of services from the EU -8.6  -39.4  -60.2  -60.6  
Imports from non-EU 1.7  3.5  4.2  3.1  
Imports to RUK 0.7  1.9  1.9  -3.2  
CPI 1.2  1.7  2.2  4.0  
Employment -0.1  -2.4  -5.6  -8.7  
Real wage -0.2  -3.6  -7.0  -9.7  
Consumption  -0.2  -3.9  -7.7  -10.6  
Government expenditure 0.9 -4.7 -10.6 -16.4 
Source: simulation results 
 
Figure 2 provides a comparative analysis of various scenarios on GDP and Employment.  
Figure 2. Long-run effects on employment and GDP, % changes relative to baseline  
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Source: simulation results 
 
 
Migration 
We know that Brexit has a substantial negative impact on both Scotland and RUK, but the latter 
is impacted more because of its greater exposure to EU trade. Accordingly, real wage falls and 
unemployment rate rises are greater in RUK than in Scotland, creating incentives for net in-
migration to the latter from the former. When we allow for this process in the trade plus fiscal  
scenario envisaged in Table 9, the fall in Scottish GDP is mitigated (ultimately falling by 5.7% 
Instead of 9.4%), whereas the fall in RUK GDP is exacerbated (-12.7% to -13%); the falls in real 
wage and unemployment rates are ultimately equalised in Scotland and RUK (-11.1% and 11% 
respectively). 
 
The impact of endogenous international migration is more problematic. However, there is no 
doubt that it would increase the scale of the adverse Brexit impacts on both Scotland and RUK, 
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possibly significantly. The overall impact of Brexit on real wage and unemployment rates, and on 
consumption per capita, are significantly negative in both regions, and would remain so in the 
presence of interregional migration, as we have seen. This implies that both regions become less 
attractive relative to REU and ROW, creating pressure for net outmigration from both regions, 
reducing labour supplies, output and employment, while causing some increase in real wage 
rates and falls in unemployment rates in both regions. In the limiting case this process would 
continue until real wages and unemployment rates were restored to their original levels – taken 
to be competitive with REU and ROW. This would require very substantial net migration flows 
that would cause major further falls in Scottish and RUK GDP . This is not, of course, the outcome 
that we would expect given barriers to freedom of movement between the UK and ROW and, 
post-Brexit, REU. However, there seems little doubt about the pressures to net outmigration that 
would exist post Brexit and their consequences for the RUK and Scottish economies. 
Productivity 
As we have already noted, the notion that Brexit will exert an additional dynamic impact through 
a projected reduction in openness (overall both imports and exports fall significantly in our 
simulations) is controversial. However, if such an effect did exist, as HM Treasury (2016) argue, 
the impacts would, of course, be unambiguously negative. When we adopt the 5% reduction in 
productivity (in both regions) assumed by the Treasury, we find that GDP in both Scotland and 
RUK falling roughly in proportion, implying a very substantial additional adverse impact of Brexit. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we explore the possible consequences of leaving the EU for the Scottish economy. 
There have been a number of studies of the impact on the UK macro-economy and some have 
calculated the regional impacts in a pro rata manner. However, ours is the first attempt to provide 
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a system-wide analysis of Brexit impacts simultaneously on both the Scottish and RUK economies. 
Any Brexit-induced reductions in economic activity in RUK would be expected to have significant 
spillover effects to Scotland, given the importance of RUK trade flows to the Scottish economy. 
Accordingly, we employ an interregional computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of Scotland 
and RUK that captures the full effects of Brexit on Scotland (and RUK). Our results support that 
approach: we find that spillover effects are substantial, accounting for nearly one fifth of the 
overall impact of Brexit on Scottish GDP.  
A number of general conclusions follow from our analysis of the likely impact of Brexit on the UK 
economy and its regions. First, withdrawal from the Single Market is, in the absence of significant 
new bilateral trade deals, unambiguously bad news for the UK economy as a whole and for both 
the Scottish and RUK economies, although rather worse news for the latter given its greater 
integration with the EU. These differential impacts suggest that the effects of leaving the EU will 
vary spatially across the UK. Scotland is in a favoured position concerning regional data, modelling 
and policy expertise. It should be a priority of the UK government to strengthen these resources 
and capabilities in all regions of the UK. 
Second, the scale of the adverse impacts of Brexit on the Scottish and RUK economies depends on 
the precise trading arrangements that are negotiated. If no trade deal is secured and the WTO 
default position is adopted, the impact on trade flows alone could generate a loss of as much as 
nearly 6% of GDP after 10 years (if imports and exports are treated symmetrically). However, we 
find that a free trade agreement in these circumstances could limit the impact after 10 years to 
just over 4% of GDP. Brexit-related negotiations therefore really matter, in that they may 
significantly mitigate the adverse trade effects of leaving the Single Market. 
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Third, the adverse impacts of Brexit can be mitigated to a degree using the reduction in the net 
fiscal contribution to the EU to stimulate public spending in both Scotland and RUK. However, even 
in the most optimistic – and unrealistic - case, where the UK makes no continuing contribution to 
the EU, the net fiscal contribution does not come close to compensating for the adverse impact on 
trade.  
Fourth, UK policy may also matter in that it can directly influence elements of the trade barriers 
that affect imports. The populist view that it would be in our interest to raise tariff and non-tariff 
barriers on imports from the EU, especially when barriers are being imposed on our exports to the 
EU, is problematic. This would have a positive effect on the Scottish economy if imports were 
primarily for consumption and workers were willing to accept a cut in their real wage. However, in 
practice, imports of intermediate goods are important, so barriers to EU imports constitute an 
adverse supply shock to the Scottish economy that is exacerbated if, as in normal times, workers 
bargain for real wages. Our results suggest that the imposition of barriers to imports from the EU 
by the UK would be self-defeating, and in fact would simply add – possibly substantially – to the 
scale of the Brexit-induced contraction. 
Fifth, our core estimates cannot be interpreted as reflecting a “worst case scenario”. If, as HM 
Treasury and others believe, Brexit, through reducing the degree of openness of the UK economy, 
impacts adversely on productivity, further economic contraction would result. Similarly, given that 
Brexit makes both Scotland and RUK less attractive locations to live and work, since real wages and 
consumption per head will be lower and unemployment rates higher as a consequence, there will 
be an incentive for out-migration, which would further depress economic activity. However, we 
should sound a note of caution here in that these conclusions are predicated upon a ceteris paribus 
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assumption, which implies that we do not consider, for example, possible new third country trade 
deals, or any other possible policy responses. 
Future research should consider alternative scenarios as appropriate, perhaps extended, subject 
to data limitations, to the other regions of the UK, although retention of the interregional approach 
would be essential (and would include competing regions closest to Scotland). As negotiations 
proceed it may be possible to narrow the range of projected outcomes, once greater clarity is 
forthcoming about possible future trade relations, including the potential for trade deals with third 
countries. Clearly, however, successful trade negotiations, and indeed economic growth in the EU 
and the rest of the world, could mitigate, or even entirely offset, some of the impacts identified 
here. 
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Appendix A. Simulation results for the Free Trade Area. 
Table A1 reports the overall results for the FTA scenario, with both export and import price shocks 
applied. This is directly comparable with the WTO results reported in Table 7 in the text. The final 
column reports the long-run results for RUK. 
 Table A1. Scotland                      
 SR 5 10 LR LR (RUK) 
GDP -0.2  -1.6  -3.9  -6.1  -8.3 
Total Exports -0.7  -3.7  -7.6  -10.0  -18.7  
Exports of goods to the EU -4.1  -19.8  -37.7  -39.3  -39.5  
Exports of services to the EU -7.5  -34.8  -62.7  -63.6  -61.0  
Exports to non-EU 0.1  1.1  2.4  0.3  3.8  
Regional exports  0.3  0.6  0.0  -2.8  -0.1  
Total imports -1.8  -7.4  -12.7  -14.4  -28.5  
Imports of goods from the EU -5.2  -21.9  -36.9  -37.7  -43.1  
Imports of services from the EU -9.2  -35.4  -54.7  -55.0  -60.0  
Imports to non-EU -0.2  -0.3  -1.0  -1.6  -7.4  
Regional imports 0.6  2.1  2.9  -0.1  -2.8  
CPI 0.2  0.8  1.1  2.1  -1.0  
Employment -0.4  -1.9  -4.0  -5.8  -8.0  
Real wage -0.6  -2.9  -5.5  -7.2  -8.7  
Consumption  -0.7  -3.2  -6.0  -7.8  -10.5  
 
Appendix B. Complete model listing. 
Prices  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃���������𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖 (A.1)  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃�������𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖 (A.2)  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∙�𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗
= 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃�������𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖 ∙�𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗
+ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃���������𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖 ∙�𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗
 (A.3)  
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸����𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖 (A.4)  
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𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃������𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖 (A.5)  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟′,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (A.6)  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (A.7)  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = ∑ 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + ∑ 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∑ 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  (A.8)  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗𝑌𝑌 = �𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 ∙ �1 − 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗 − 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗� −�𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
� (A.9)  
𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 ∙ (𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟) (A.10)  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡1−𝜎𝜎𝑐𝑐 = �𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓
𝑗𝑗
∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡1−𝜎𝜎𝑐𝑐 (A.11)  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡1−𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔 = �𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗𝑔𝑔
𝑗𝑗
∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡1−𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔  (A.12)  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡1−𝜌𝜌 = ��𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉
𝑗𝑗
∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡1−𝜌𝜌
𝑖𝑖
 (A.13)  
𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 = 𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡�1 + 𝜏𝜏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡� (A.14)  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �
𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏
𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡� = 𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟 − 0.113 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡� (A.15)  
𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘 ∙ 𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑌𝑌𝜚𝜚𝑗𝑗 ∙ �𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡�1−𝜚𝜚𝑗𝑗 (A.16)  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 = ∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 ∙ ∑ 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ∑ ∑ 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  (A.17)  
Production technology  
𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋 ∙ �𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋 + 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉 ∙ 𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋 � 1𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋  (A.18)  
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𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = �𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗𝑋𝑋 ∙ 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗𝑌𝑌 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 � 11−𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗𝑋𝑋 ∙ 𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 (A.19)  
𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = �𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗𝑋𝑋 ∙ 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡� 11−𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗𝑋𝑋 ∙ 𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 (A.20)  
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉 ∙ 𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (A.21)  
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟 ∙ �𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 ∙ 𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌 + 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 ∙ 𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌 � 1𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌 (A.22)  
𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = �𝐴𝐴𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗𝑌𝑌 ∙ 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 � 11−𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗𝑌𝑌 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 (A.23)  
Trade  
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 ∙ �𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 + 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 � 1𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴  (A.24)  
𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡
𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = ��𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 � ∙ �𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖 �� 11−𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴  (A.25)  
𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 ∙ �𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 +  𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 � 1𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 (A.26)  
𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡
𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = ��𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 � ∙ �𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖�� 11−𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 (A.27)  
𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 ∙ �𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 +  𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 � 1𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 (A.28)  
𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡
𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = ��𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 � ∙ �𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�� 11−𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 (A.29)  
𝐸𝐸_𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸_𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃���������𝑖𝑖 ∙ �𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 (A.30)  
𝐸𝐸_𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸_𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃�����������𝑖𝑖 ∙ � 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 (A.31)  
48 
 
𝐸𝐸_𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟′,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (A.32)  
 𝐸𝐸_𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐸𝐸_𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐸𝐸_𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡    (A.33)  
Regional Demand 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = �𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗
 
(A.34)  
Total Production 
𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = �𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗
 
(A.35)  
 
Households and other Domestic Institutions 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 = �1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡�𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 �1 − 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡�𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 + Π𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 (A.36)  
𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 ∙  𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇����� (A.37)  
Π𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟ℎ ∙�𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
 (A.38)  
𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 (A.39)  
 𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 (A.40)  
𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ∙ � 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ∙ 𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 (A.41)  
𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 ∙ �𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 + 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑣𝑣 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴  � 1𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴  (A.42)  
𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = ��𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑣𝑣� ∙ � 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡��
1
1−𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴
 (A.43)  
49 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 ∙ �𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 + 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴  � 1𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 (A.44)  
𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = ��𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 � ∙ � 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡��
1
1−𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴
 (A.45)  
𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 ∙ �𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑟𝑟 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 + 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴  � 1𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴  (A.46)  
𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = ��𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖 � ∙ �𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡��
1
1−𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴
 (A.47)  
Government  
𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑄𝑄𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 + � 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑,𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 ∙
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡
−  �𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔 ∙�𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
+ �𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
+ 𝜏𝜏𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 ∙�𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗
∙ 𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟����� ∙ 𝜀𝜀𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡� (A.48)  
𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔 ∙ 𝑄𝑄𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 (A.49)  
𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡;  𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 0 (A.50)  
Investment Demand  
𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = �𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗
∙ 𝐽𝐽𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 (A.51)  
𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣 ∙ �𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 + 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴  � 1𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴  (A.52)  
𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = ��𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟� ∙ �𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖 ��
1
1−𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴
 (A.53)  
𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣 ∙ �𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 + 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴  � 1𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴  (A.54)  
50 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = ��𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 � ∙ �𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖��
1
1−𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴
 (A.55)  
𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 ∙ �𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 + 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴  � 1𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 (A.56)  
𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = ��𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖� ∙ �𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡��
1
1−𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴
 (A.57)  
Time path of investment  
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑃𝑃 ∙ �𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗ − 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� ∙ 𝛿𝛿𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (A.58)  
𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗ = �𝐴𝐴𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗𝑌𝑌 ∙ 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡� 11−𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗𝑌𝑌 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 (A.59)  
Factors accumulation  
𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟) ∙ 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (A.60)  
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆���𝑟𝑟  (A.61)  
𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (A.62)  
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 ∙ �1 − 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡� = �𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗
 (A.63)  
Indirect taxes and subsidies  
𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 (A.64)  
Total demand for import and current account  
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = �𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 +
𝑗𝑗
�𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 +
𝑗𝑗
𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (A.65)  
51 
 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 = �𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖 −�𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
+ 𝜀𝜀 ∙ (𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 + 𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟) (A.66)  
Assets  
𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (A.67)  
𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 (A.68)  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡+1 ∙ 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡+1 = �1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + �𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡+1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 − 1�� ∙ 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 (A.69)  
Steady State conditions  
𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟 ∙ 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇 (A.70)  
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘 = 𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟) (A.71)  
𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟,𝑇𝑇 = −�𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + �𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡+1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 − 1�� ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑇𝑇 ∙ 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟,𝑇𝑇 (A.72)  
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟,𝑇𝑇 = −𝑟𝑟 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟,𝑇𝑇  (A.73)  
𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟 = (1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡)𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑  (1 − 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡)𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 + 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 (A.74)  
                      𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,𝑇𝑇 = Π𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 (A.75)  
Glossary 
i,j   (i=j)                   the set of goods or industries 
r,r'   (r=r')                   the set of regions 
 
Prices  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 value added price 
52 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 regional price 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 output price 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 national commodity price (regional + RUK) 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 price of RUK commodities  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 price of ROW commodities 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 price of REU commodities 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 price of non-EU commodities 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 price of non-EU exports  
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 price of REU exports  
𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 rate of return to capital 
𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟,𝑏𝑏 unified nominal wage 
𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟,𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏  after tax wage 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑏𝑏 capital good price 
𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟,𝑏𝑏 user cost of capital 
𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 shadow price of capital 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑏𝑏 aggregate consumption price 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑏𝑏 aggregate price of Government consumption goods 
𝜀𝜀 exchange rate [fixed] 
  
Endogenous variables  
𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 total output 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 regional supply 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 total import 
𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 total export (interregional + international) 
𝐸𝐸_𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 export to REU 
53 
 
𝐸𝐸_𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 export to non-EU 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 value added 
𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 labour demand 
𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 physical capital demand 
𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 capital stock 
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 labour supply 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑗𝑗,𝑏𝑏 total intermediate inputs in i and j 
𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 Total intermediate inputs in i  
𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑗𝑗,𝑏𝑏 regional intermediate inputs 
𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑗𝑗,𝑏𝑏 ROW intermediate inputs 
𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑗𝑗,𝑏𝑏 REU intermediate inputs 
𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑗𝑗,𝑏𝑏 Non-EU intermediate inputs 
𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑗𝑗,𝑏𝑏 national intermediate inputs (ROW + RUK) 
𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑗𝑗,𝑏𝑏 RUK intermediate inputs 
𝑄𝑄𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 aggregate government expenditure  
𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 total government expenditure by sector i 
𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 regional government expenditure 
𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 government expenditure( RUK + ROW) 
𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟,𝑏𝑏 aggregated household consumption 
𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 total households consumption in sector i   
𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 regional consumption in sector i  
𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 regional + RUK consumption in sector i  
𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 ROW import consumption in sector i  
𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 REU import consumption in sector i  
𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 Non-EU import consumption in sector i  
54 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 total investment by sector of origin i 
𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 regional investment by sector of origin i 
𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 ROW investment demand 
𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 REU investment demand 
𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 Non-EU investment demand 
𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 national investment (regional + RUK) 
𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏 RUK investment demand 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑏𝑏 investment by sector of destination j 
𝐽𝐽𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗,𝑏𝑏 investment by destination j with adjustment cost 
𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟,𝑏𝑏 regional unemployment rate 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃  marginal net revenue of capital 
𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,𝑏𝑏 domestic non-government saving 
𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟,𝑏𝑏 households net transfer 
YHr,t Household income  
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟,𝑏𝑏 current account balance 
  
Exogenous variables  
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃������𝑟𝑟,𝑏𝑏 remittances for Household 
𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸����𝑟𝑟,𝑏𝑏 remittances for the Government 
𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟,𝑏𝑏 government saving 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 interest rate 
  
Elasticities  
𝜎𝜎 constant elasticity of marginal utility  
𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐
𝑋𝑋 elasticity between intermediate inputs and value added 
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𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐
𝑃𝑃 elasticity between capital and labour 
𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐
𝐴𝐴 elasticity in Armington function 
𝜎𝜎𝑐𝑐
𝑏𝑏 elasticity of export with respect to terms of trade 
  
Parameters  
𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉  Input-output coefficients for i used in j 
𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃  share of value added on production 
𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃,𝑉𝑉 shares in CES output function in sector j 
𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃,𝑙𝑙 shares in value added function in sector j 
𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟,𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚,𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 shares parameters in CES function for intermediate goods 
𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑗𝑗𝑞𝑞𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟,𝑞𝑞𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚,𝑞𝑞𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑞𝑞𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 shares parameters in CES function for investment goods 
𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,ℎℎ𝑟𝑟,ℎ𝑚𝑚 shares parameters in CES function for households consumption  
𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 shares parameters in CES function for government consumption  
𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 shift parameter in CES functions for intermediate goods 
𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇  shift parameter in CES function for households consumption goods 
𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃  shift parameter in CES function for government consumption  
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐 rate of business tax 
𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑗𝑗 physical capital matrix 
𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟 rate of saving  
𝜏𝜏𝑟𝑟 rate of income tax 
𝜌𝜌 pure rate of consumer time preference 
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟 rate of distortion or incentive to investment 
𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟 rate of depreciation 
 
 
